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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
8989

vs.
MARY VATSIS,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The V & H Motor Company was an automobile dealership doing business in Price, Utah. The appellant, Mrs.
Mary Vatsis, was office manager for the V & H Motor Company and handled its books and records (T. 163). She considered herself to be a part of the company for she refers
to the records as "my books" (T. 159). Mrs. Vatsis testified that she sold cars for V & H Motor Company (T. 154)
and her entire testimony was to the effect that she made
the contracts and handled the financial affairs for the V
& H Motor Company.
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The dealership had an operating arrangement with
Commercial Credit Corporation, whose district office was
in Provo, Utah, for the purchasing of conditional sales contracts for the financing of automobiles sold. It is customary
in financing automobiles that the contract is sold to the
finance company before the title is furnished to the finance
company because it takes some time for the title to be returned from the State Tax Commission. The fact is that
at the time they sell the contract they forward to the Tax
Commission the title for change of registration, showing
the new owner and lienholder. During the period involved
in this case the V & H Motor Company through Mary Vatsis
( T. 154) presented and sold to the Commercial Credit Corporation a contract dated March 9, 1957, purportedly bearing the signature of one Ann Troulis covering a blue colored
1956 Buick automobile, Serial No. 6-C2018583. The appellant knew that it was a false and fraudulent contract for
she drew it up and signed the name of Ann Troulis and
submitted it to Commercial Credit Corporation when in
fact the car had not been sold to Ann Troulis. The Credit
Company, in relying on the representations of the appellant,
bought the contract and under check dated March 12, 1957,
paid V & H Motor Company $2,175.00, which was received
and deposited by Mary Vatsis to the account of the dealership (T. 148). This same car was later sold, on April 26,
1957, to Chris Bolotos, who paid cash for the car (T. 164)
and title to the car was transferred to 1\:'[r. Bolotos. After
selling the car to Mr. Bolotos, Mary Vatsis knowingly and
on behalf of the V & H Motor Company, made three payments on the said car to Commercial Credit, (T. 158),
thereby continuing the fraudulent transaction.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
Point I and Point II of appellant's brief are based
upon the same premise, that a forgery had to be shown in
order to prove the appellant guilty of any crime.
We wish to call the Court's attention to the fact that
this case did not go to trial on information (R. 15) but in
fact went to trial on amended information (R. 57). This
amended information was filed and allowed by the Court
prior to trial and reads as follows :
"Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District Attorney for the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Utah and accuses Tl/.[ary Vatsis and John Vatsis,
they having been duly bound over to answer this
charge by a committing magistrate, and charges that
the said Mary Vats is and John Vatsis, on or about
the 12th day of March, 1957, at Utah County, State
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of Utah, did commit the crime of a felony, to-wit:
Obtaining money under false pretenses, committed
as follows, to-wit: That they, the said Mary Vatsis
and John Vatsis, at the time and place aforesaid, did
wilfully, intentionally and feloniously obtain a check
in the amount of $6, 700.00, which check was paid
from the funds of the Commercial Credit Corporation, a corporation, by the Walker Bank and Trust
Company. This check was obtained by the defendants by representing and selling to the said Commercial Credit Corporation for the sum of $2,175.00,
which sum was paid out of the aforementioned check,
a fraudulent Conditional Sales Contract dated March
9, 1957, and purported to be entered into by and
between Ann Troulis and V & H Motor Company,
which Conditional Sales Contract was fraudulent
and forged ; the said Mary Vatsis and John Vatsis
well knowing that the said Conditional Sales Contract was fraudulent, forged and of no value."
The interesting point about this information is that the gist
of the information is that the appellant did obtain money
under false p,retenses by "* * * representing and selling to the said Commercial Credit Corporation for the sum
of $2,175.00, which sum was paid out of the aforementioned
check, a fraudulent contract dated March 9, 1957." (Emphasis added.) The gravamen of the offense is that it was
a fraudulent sales contract. The fact that the information
further down says "that the said Conditional Sales Contract
was fraudulent, forged and of no value" is mere surplusage.
This is not binding upon the State nor does it restrict the
proof. The answer to this argument also answers counsel's
contention in Point II in respect to this particular point.
We quote to the Court the following statutes as authority
for this position:
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"Any allegation unnecessary under the existing
law or under the provisions of this chapter, may, if
contained in an information, indictment or bill of
particulars, be disregarded; as surplusage."
(77-21-42, U. C. A. 1953.)
The case in point on this is Ballaine v. District Court of the
First Jud'icial District for Box Elder County, 107 Utah 247,
153 P. 2d 265, which cites the above statute and holds surplusage in information charged in a crime of obtaining
money and property under false pretenses does not vitiate
the essential elements in defense being set forth in the
pleading. The law is well settled on this question of surplusage for the courts have repeatedly held as long as the
essential elements are present, the remainder is regarded
as surplusage. Especially is this true under Section 77-2147, U. C. A. 1953, which sets forth the short form of pleadings.
In the case of State v. Schow, 125 P. 2d 955, in citing
Section 77-21-42, the court stated:
~eThe repugnant allegations shall not invalidate
an information and that unnecessary allegations may
be treated as surplusage."

State v. Robbins, 127 P. 2d 1042; State v. Burke, 129 P. 2d
560.
We respectfully state to the court the essential elements
of the complaint have been set forth in the pleading. We
cite to the Court the statute concerning obtaining money
under false pretenses :
"Every person who knowingly and designedly,
by false or fraudulent representations or pretenses,
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obtains from any other person any chose in action,
money, goods, wares, chattels, effects or other valuable thing, with intent to cheat or defraud any person of the same, if the value of the property so obtained does not exceed $50.00, is punishable as in
cases of petit larceny, and when the property so obtained is of the value of more than $50.00, the person so offending is punishable as in cases of grand
larceny.''
(76-20-8, U. C. A. 1953.)

The gist of the statute is that moneys must be obtained
by false and fraudulent representations or pretenses. That
is what the State charged the appellant with and that is
what the jury found her guilty of. The word "forgery'' is
nothing more than surplusage, and is not necessary to be
proved if the contract itself was false and fraudulent and
the jury had sufficient evidence to find such fact to be true.
Regardless of whether the information required the
State to prove that the contract was forged, th__gre js sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that it was. In argu-----~~~;_----~~--~~~~ing this point the State does not concede a forgery was, in
fact, an element of obtaining money under false pretenses,
it being the State's position that the pretense was that this
is a valid contract, when in fact it was false and fraudulent.
It was fraudulent for a number of reasons besides the question of signature, ,Eowever, the tes_!!mony ot.~___r_r'Nllllli
was . -sufficient
for --··the jury....__to co~~1Yd_El..f9rgery
.
..
--......___.._-"-~-·-- --~~~" ···~·····-~--"'

.

~-~········-----~·--·-.

, ___ ~·-----~··

.

Ann Troulis was a very evasive, equivocable witness.
She had admittedly testified in two different ways concerning the contract. Her testimony at the preliminary hearing,
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part of which was admitted into evidence, was that she had
positively not authorized the signature, nor had she purchased the car (Tr. 60). Her testimony in respect to authorization was completely unbelievable and the only conclusion that the jury could come to was the contract was,
in fact, forged. Rather than set out the entire transcript
of testimony in this brief, we cite to the Court the Troulis
testimony from Tr. 54 to Tr. 70.
The Troulis testimony itself is sufficient to show forgery, however, when connected with the testimony of Mr.
Allen and Mr. Frandsen as to what Mary Vatsis haq...,said_
to
,..r'"".
them, it would appear to make it conclusive( Mr. Allen ··
~
testified that Mary Vatsis told him that she had sold cars
to
Lee Allred and Spiros Aganis and then signed their... names
...... .,....
...
..,to ..,....separate contracts and sold the cantracts...:tG-Co.~
Cr.~diiJ!nd received money from the Finance Company in
payment for the contracts when act.nally_the cars had be_~n
~--ea-sh- These two contracts indicated her intent to
defraud and corroborating of forgery (Tr. 180-181). Mr.
Allen (Tr. 182) also testified that there were other con- - - -....-,----·-·-----~---·-······ ........... .....-~
tracts of the same nature that she had admitted to him were
fo;g~d~~;;d· fraudul~~t:· .This t~;i;;;-~y- ..is corroborated ·by
tl~;-·t~;ti;:~~y-~f'--Mi:: Frandsen (Tr. 118). Mr. Frandsen
testified (Tr. 118 to 120) that Mary Vatsis placed th~-Ann
Troulis contract in a category with other contracts, which
she stated she had attached the signatures to, sold to Commercial Credit and received money for. These were contracts where there weren't customers, or the cars were not
in the possession of customers, or cars hadn't been registered, or there had not been any documents submitted
··-.~.._.,_

_____

-,

__

,,
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to the State for registration. Mr. Frandsen then testified
that she proceeded to tell him (Tr. 120) how these contracts, which included the Troulis contract, were sold to
Commercial Credit and how she operated the V & H Motor
Company (Tr. 120, Line 2 through Line 20):
"She said she would take these contracts into
the office in Provo and submit the contracts to the
employees at that office and they would write a
check to her and she would also write them a check
to pay off other contracts, and one week she would
write a check for $5,000.00, the next week, why she
would have to write a check for $6,000.00 to take care
of contracts submitted the week before, until it got
so that all they were doing was exchanging checks,
the V & H Motor Company and the branch office of
Commercial Credit in Provo. She also said that it
was through this transaction that she was losing
money, that the contracts that were submitted the
week before would be forgotten about and there
would be more important business come up, and it
got so that she was up on a balloon and she asked
to get off of this balloon and nobody seemed to be
able to help her clear this matter up."
From this evidence the jury had ample reason to conclude
that the Troulis contract was a forgery.
The appellant has made great to-do about a variance
contained in the inforn1ation and the Bill of Particulars.
In order to understand the answer to the bill of particulars
it is necessary to set forth both the questions and the
answers, which the appellant has failed to do. We refer
the Court to the questions (R. 16) and the answers (R. 20).
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The appellant has argued to the Court that the information
is limited by the bill of particulars.
We refer the Court to the case of State v. Dabb, 84 S.
2d 601, wherein the Court stated:
"Irrespective of what may be contained or set
forth in the bill of particulars relied on by the defendant to support his contention presented by these
bills, we are not concerned therewith. The prosecution was conducted exclusively on what was contained within the four corners of the bill of information, and we cannot look beyond its four corners
to determine its validity. There can be no prosecution on a bill of particulars. Nor can the contents
of a bill of particulars, whatsoever is set forth therein, alter, change, amend or affect the bill of information. A bill of particulars can neither create a
defect in a bill of information nor remedy a defective one. * * *"
See also State v. Varnado, 23 S. 2d 106, 126; State v. McQueen, 87 S. 2d 727; Hevener v. Commonwealth, 54 S. E.
2d 893; 27 Am. J ur., Indictments and Informations, Sec.
112.
We state that the Bill of Particulars does not do any
more than answer the questions submitted by the appellant
and was never intended to be more than that. Question 3
in the Bill of Particulars has been fully and completely
answered and does not, in effect, say that the appellant did
not submit to the Commercial Credit Corporation the fraudulent contract. Nor can it be implied from the language
that she did not. We cite to the Court 77-21-43:
"(2) No variance between those allegations of
an information, indictment or bill of particulars,
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which state the particulars. of the offense, whether
amended or not, and the evidence offered in support
thereof shall be ground for the acquittal of the defendant. The court may at any time cause the information, indictment or bill of particulars to be
amended in respect to any such variance, to conform
to the evidence."
" ( 3) If the court is of the opinion that the
defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon
the merits by any such defect, imperfection or omission or by any such variance the court may because
of such defect, imperfection, omission or variance,
unless the defendant objects, postpone the trial, to
be had before the same or another jury on such terms
as the court considers proper. In determining
whether the defendant has been prejudiced in his
defense upon the merits, the court shall consider
all the circumstances of the case and the entire course
of the prosecution."
"(4) No appeal, or motion made after verdict,
based on any such defect, imperfection, omission, or
variance shall be sustained unless it is affirmatively
shown that the defendant was in fact prejudiced
thereby in his defense upon the merits."
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the defendant raised no objection to the limitation, if there was
such a limitation, in the Bill of Particulars. If it is her
contention that forgery had to be shown, she has not to this
date ever moved the Court for a postponement based or
premised on the defendant not being informed as to what
she was charged with.
In the case of Hevener v. Commonwealth, supra, the
appellant on appeal contended that there was a variance in
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the indictment and the bill of particulars as to whether the
charge was first or second degree murder. The court stated:
"The accused would have us say that the first
degree murder charge in the indictment was nullified by reason of the bill of particulars. He was not
to be tried upon the bill of particulars, but only upon
the indictment. The two instruments were to be
read together.
"* * *
"He also sat by and heard evidence going to the
jury which tended to support a charge of murder in
the first degree without objecting. If he thought at
that time that the charge of murder in the first
degree had been eliminated and that he would be
tried for no higher offense than second degree murder, he should have objected to that evidence. If he
had done so and there had been merit in his objection, it is quite likely the court would have permitted
an enlarging amendment to the bill of particulars
if it were insufficient, making it conform to the
evidence. * * *"
If the appellant was dissatisfied with the Bill of Par-

ticulars and if the Bill of Particulars and information did
not set forth a crime, then the appellant had a remedy by
filing a motion to quash the information as set forth in
Section 77-21-10. When a crime is charged and the appellant fully apprised of the facts does not avail herself of the
remedies supplied by law, she cannot, at this late date, be
heard to complain. State v. Russell, 145 P. 2d 1003.
If the appellant's contention were correct, it would be

necessary for the State of Utah in every case to plead evidentiary facts and those facts not pleaded could not be
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proved. This would be an unreasonable burden to place
upon the State.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3.
The appellant takes objection to Instruction No.3 and
particularly to the use of the words "fictitious" and "bona
fide." Its brief proceeds to limit the word "fictitious" by
a criminal definition for fictitious check. Fictitious has an
ordinary connotation which is intended in ths case. The
Court was not instructing the jury in respect to a fictitious
check but was using the word "fictitious" in a normal,
grammatical sense. "Fictitious" is defined in Webster's
Dictionary as follows :
"Feigned ; imaginary ; not genuine, like fiction."
It must be presumed that the jury was of normal intelligence. This is not an unusual or strange word, but is a common word used by laymen and people of ordinary intelligence. It properly describes the contract because it was,
in fact, not genuine. What could be a better adjective than
"fictitious?"
"Bona fide" is in the nature of the same type of word.
This is a word that has a common connotation, understood
by the ordinary man on the street as meaning genuine.
There is no reason to suppose that the jury did not understand what "bona fide" meant. The term was even used
by the appellant's attorney in the examination of a witness
(Tr. 33). The ve:ry language of the paragraph in the in-
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struction is sufficient to show the meaning of "bona fide"
but even if the word were left out the meaning would be
clear. "Bona fide" is not essential for the clarity of the
paragraph, consequently, this argument is not sound.
The Court, in giving Instruction No. 3, realized that
forgery was not an element of the crime of obtaining money
by false pretense. The instruction was that if the jury found
that Mary Vatsis presented a fictitious contract that did
not represent a bona fide sale of an automobile, and Mary
Vatsis knew it, then the jury should find her guilty. The
State, as set forth in the record and as outlined in the foregoing part of this brief, certainly brought forth evidence
proving this instruction.
The appellant, on pages 11 and 14 of her brief, relies a
great deal on the contention that if it were not a forgery
then the Commercial Credit Corporation was not injured
because it would be a binding contract against Ann Troulis.
The appellant is avoiding the fact that Commercial Credit
bought the contract relying on the representation of Mary
Vatsis that it was a valid contract and that the signature
attached thereto was the signature of Ann Troulis, when,
in fact, it was not her signature and no evidence was brought
forward to dispute this point. The fact of the matter is
that Commercial Credit was not interested in buying a lawsuit to prove if Ann Troulis signed the contract or if she
gave Mary Vatsis the right to sign her name, but was
interested in buying a contract signed by Ann Troulis for
the financing of an automobile. Even in trying to deny that
she didn't give the appellant the right to sign her name,
Mrs. Troulis never, at anytime, said that she bought the car
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or gave the appellant the right to sign her name. We are
sure the court can see the lawsuit that this would involve
and the difficulty of proving the contract.
As the record shows, Ann Troulis changed her testimony from that given at the preliminary hearing but she
changed it from definitely not giving the appellant the right
to sign her name to "I don't remember". She indicated that
she did not buy the car and would not accept the responsibility of the contract. She even stated that the reason she
testified at the preliminary hearing that she did not give
the appellant the right to sign her name was because she
was afraid they would force her to buy a car that she could
not afford. On page 62 of the transcript, she testified:
"Q.

"A.
one."

Did you ever buy any other car from her?
No. I mean, I was planning on buying

This affirms the fact that she did not buy a car and was
not intending to be bound by the contract signed by the
appellant. Commercial Credit did not receive what they
bargained for, so even if Ann Troulis decided to accept the
contract at a later date, it would still not take the appellant
off the hook, for in the case of State v. Caspm·son (Appeal
of Snyder), 71 Utah 68, 262 Pac. 294, the court said:
"That a pretense false in fact and an actual fraud
resulting in prejudice are essential elements of the
crime in question, and must be proved to establish
guilt, are general principles of law which we recognize and approve. The actual fraud and prejudice
required, however, is determined according to the
situaHon of the victim in1mediately after he parts
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with his property. If he gets what was pretended
and what he bargained for, there is no fraud or
prejudice. But if he then stands without the right
or thing it was pretended he would then have, he has
been defrauded and prejudiced by reason of the false
pretense, and the offense is complete, notwithstanding thereafter he may regain his property, or the
person obtaining it or another compensates him, or
he thereafter obtains full redress in some manner
not contemplated when he parted with his property."
This was affirmed in the case of State v. Fisher, 8 P. 2d, p.
589. This would indicate that if it were a fictitious contract
that did not represent a bona fide sale of the automobile
and Mary Vatsis was aware of it, then it would amount to
obtaining money by false pretense even if at a later date
Commercial Credit recouped its loss.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and that the Court's
instruction was not erroneous.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

HOMER F. WILKINSON,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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